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1 . Introduction
Jn a private market economy in which business firms seek to maximize profits, racial
discrimination in the workplace makes no economic sense. Why? Because it is costly. When an
employer hires or pays wages on the basis of race rather than productivity, the outcome is
inefficient and profits are sacrificed. Why, then, would a profit-driven firm ever knowingly trade
off profits in order to pra cti ce racial discrimination? Nobel Laureate Gary Becker, in his Ph.D.
dissertation (1957) and in a later book in which he refined and extended his disset1ation research
( 1971 ) , provides a simplc but pow·erful answer.

utility-maximizing.

Racial discrimination is preference-based and

If an employer has a preference

(i . e . , taste) for

discrimination, then the

ability ro act on this preference increases the employer's utility.
For over 30 years now empirical research on racial discrimination in the workplace has
been defined by, and focused on, Becker's insight

The literature is now extensive, highly

technical, and to some extent fragmented-as groups of analysts have concentrated on different
aspects of the problem.

This p<:�per is intended to be a "primer" on this work for the non

specialist who \vants to get up to speed on, or possibly begin contributing to, this line of research.

In what follows, therefore, I highlight some of the important articles, key methodological
advances, and central results that have been obtained to date. More specifically, in the rest of this
section I lay out Becker's theory of discrimination and its central predictions.

introduce the reader, in

a

In Section 2 I

nontechnical way, to the scope of the research effort that has developed

in the wake of Becker's work. I then turn, in Section 3, to studies of racial employment patterns
in the airline and trucking industries and highlight the contributions of these studies to our
understanding of discrimination in the workplace. Multi-industry studies of discrimination in the
setting of wage ra tes are the focus of Section 4. In conclusion I ol1er some comments on what
ViC

have learned to date, and where do we go from here.
Becker's theory can be understood in a "principal-agent" context.

principal-a business owner, or a group

of owners

information concerning the operations o f the firm.

Supp ose that the

such as shareholders-has incomplete
This provides the agen t- the business

manager-with the opportunity to maximize his/her own utility by engaging in discretionary
behavior.

If the manager acts on this opportunity, and i f the manager has a preference for

discrimination, then the m an a ger will seek to exercise this preference. But doing so results in
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loss of p ro fi ts for the firm. So, the key question is this: Under \Vhat circumstances is a manager

actually able to indul ge his/her taste for discrimination?

Becker's answer is straightforward:

When the firm is in a non-competitive industry and therefore earning excess pr ofits. It is these
excess profits tbat enable the firm to absorb the inefli ciency associated with discrimination and
continue to earn pro fi ts for the owner ( s).
This c onj ecture leads dire ctly to what I will call the "Basic Becker Hypothesis": Racial
discrimination in the v..-orkplace will be more pronounced in non-competitive indu s tries than in
competitive industries. Enhanced competition in p roduc t markets, th e re fore, should lead to less
racial discrimination in the workp lace. Now, does this mean that Becker thinks (or argues) that
the preference for dis c rimina tion is a p ositive function of product market concentration?
Becker's point is that the ability to exerc i se a given p reference
correlated \'-iith product market concentr ation.

Firms with monopoly power are not inherentl y

more dis criminato ry than firms in competitive indus tries

.

They simply have more of an ab i lity

thanks to the existence of excess profits-to act on their preferences.
industries do not engage in less

racial discrimination in the

Firms .in competitive

wo rkpl a ce because t hey

''virtuous" in this regard, but rather because they can't. Under intense pressure
and without excess profits to

No.

for discrimination is positively

to

are more

manage costs,

expend on costly indu lgences such firms cannot afford to practice
,

racial discrimination.
2. 30 Years of Empiric al Testing:

A Non-technical

Introduction

Empiric al research on the extent to which the Basic Becker Hypot h esi s
of rac ial discrimination in the workplace has taken 1\VO approaches.
relationship
follo wi ng

between "Empl oyme nt Discrimination"

q uestions :

concentration?

Is

minority

Does enhanced

and market structure, by asking the

employment in vers ely

c om p etition

exp lains patterns

Some analysts focus on the

correlated

with

product

market

in an industry lead to increased employment

opp011unities for minorities? [n general, are racial hiring patterns influenced by product market
structure?

Other economists train their

Discrimination" and market structure
black/white wage gap,

.

sights on the relationship between "Earnings

The key questions asked in these studies are: Is the

for si milar workers in simil ar occupations, positive ly correlated with

produ ct market concentration? Does en hanced competition in an industry result in smaller racial
v.•age gaps ?

More generally, are minority wages and salaries

a

fu nction of pro d uct marke1

structure?
In the 1970's, during the years immedi ate ly following the publication of the second
edition of Becker s The Eronomics of Discrimination
'

(1971 ) ,

a

flurry of

attempted to test the Basic Becker Hypothesis in a multi-industry context.

e mpi r i cal

studies

The results were

mixed. The issue of Employment Discrimination \Vas tackled by Comanor (I 973), Shepherd

&

Le vin (1973), and Hacssel & Palmer ( 1 978) who focused on the re lat io nshi p between the racia[
of employment and product market concentration. A later reviewer or th ese studies
,

com po sition

(Heywood, in a 1987 paper otherwise focused on Earnings Discrimination) concluded that they

found a mo derate or "reasonable" level of support for the Basic Becke r Hypothesis. But the
"

"

two major studies done on Earnings Discrimination-Fujii & Trapani (1978) and Johnson ( 1978)

found no clear connection between product market concentration and minority wages.
Then, a wave of Deregulation swept through U.S. indust ry in the late 1970's and early
1980's. From 1976 to 1984, the U.S. Government loosened its grip on the trucking, railroad,
airline, and telecommunications industries by deregulating ( 1 ) entr y into and exit from markets
and (2) prices and rate-s etting The goal of these regulatory reforms was to promote competition
.
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-

by allowing private market forces to play a g reater role in determining pri c es, proftts, and entry
into markets.

Economists were thus give n a go lden op portun ity to test the Basic Becker

Hyp oth esis : Researchers now had the chance to study Deregulation's effect on racial hiring

patterns and racial wage di ffer entials in a single i nd ustry over time.
'vVork on the relationship between Deregulation and Earnings Discrimination began with

( 1987). I-ler findings, along with those obtained by Heywood ( 1998), Peoples
(1993), and Peop les & R obi nso n (1996), reveal strong support for the Basic Bec k er
Rose

& Saun ders
Hypo thesis.

When Deregulation g ene rate s enhanced competition in an industry, racial wage gaps get smaller.
Deregulation's effect on Empl oy ment Discrimination will be discu ssed later, in

I h igh lig h t the wor k of

Agesa (200 I)

compar e her rcs ulls with those obtained in studies of the trucking i ndustry
Empirical

work

on

S ection

3, wh ere

o n racial employment patterns in the airline industry and
.

the relationship between product market structure and racial

di scri m ination in the workplace, up to the present, has heen sustained and driv en by t h ree key
facto rs

.

First, improvem ent s in data collection have enabled r esearchers to construct more useful

and app ropriate data sets.

In parti cu l ar , during the 1980's it became p ossi ble for researchers to

m atch up workers more accurate ly with concentrated and unconcentrated industries.
advances

in

econometric

techniques

have

made

it

possibl e

to

examine

the

S econ d ,

market

structure/discrimination connection more carefully and correctly. Researchers now have a good

u nderst anding of the control variables, dummy variabl es , and inte raction terms necessary to
identify and h igh ligh t the differential impact of market stru ct ure on white and black workers.

More generally, econom ists now have more of an un derstanding of, and an ability to correct for,
specifi c ation error-especially in wage equat ions

.

Third, the results that have been obtained over the years continue to s tim ula te thinking,
both empirical and theoretical, on the nature of racial discrimination in the workpl ace

.

Recent

work has uncovered three features of the labor-market context that qualify the Basic Becker
Hypothesi s in i mpo11ant respects: Unionization, job-skill l ev el, and labor supply constraints at
various skill level s

.

Taken together, these resutts have not caused researchers to rej e ct the Basic

Becker Hypothesis, but rather to dev elop a more nuanced, context-specific view of the
rel atio nsh ip between produ ct market concentration and racial discrimination in the •vorkplace.

Beginning with Peoples (!994), research on the efiects ofunionization has shown that the
behavior of labor

unions alters

the rel ationship betv.'cen market structure and Earnings

Discrimination. The focus of unions on negotiating standardized wages for their

J

members-what

will call th e "union \vage-standardization effect"-appears to offset the inOuence of product

market con c entr ation on raci al wage gaps in a variety of setti ngs
Agcsa & Agesa,

2007 forthcom ing) are exploring the

.

At pre sent, some analysts (e.g.,

empirical limits, or reach, of the union

wage-standardizati on effect-in terms of its abil ity to prevent Earnings Discrimi nation acros s
di ffere nt occupationa l c at eg ori es in un ionized , conce ntrat ed in dustries

.

The que stion of how job-skill levels influence the market structure/discrimination
rel ationshi p has Icc! to an expl icit theoretical extension of the Basic Becker H ypothe sis, which
has provided the impetus lor continued

H ypothe sis,

"

devel oped in Heywood &

empirical research.

The so-call ed "Skill Based

P eoples (1994), states

that the form which racial

discrimination in a p rofita ble non-competitive in dustry takes (i.e., Emp loym en t or Earnin gs
Di s crimination) is a fun ct ion of the skill level of workers.

For b lack lov.·-skill workers who

supply their talents elasti c al l y to an industry, discrimination will be employment-based rather
than earnings-based.

Black high-skill workers, who supply their labor ine lastically to an
66

industry, will face a greater earni ngs gap as a result of product market concentration, but will
experience little or no Employment Discrimination.

The following simple supply and demand

analysis highlights, intuitively, the nature of this argument.
Figures I an d

2 below highlight the interaction between the supply of and demand for

labor in a p mticu lar industry. Suppose that all workers, black and white, arc identical in terms of
skills and productivity. In Figure I the workers are l ow-skilled and easily replaced, so the supply
of labor overall (St.) is perfectly elastic. In the absence of discrimination total employment wiU
be E * and the wage rate will be W*, as determined by the intersection of
illustrative purposes only,
Ew,B is one-half of E*.
excess profits.

asswn.e

SL

and Dt..

For

an equal amount of white and black employment (Ew,B) so that

Suppose no\:v that this indust1y is non-competitive and that firms earn

If employers h ave a preference for discrimination and act on it, and if overall

employment remains constant, then the resuH will be a decline in black employment coupled
with an increase in white employment. This can be thought of as a bifurcation of labor demand:
al any given wage rate the demand for black labor (DBL) will be less than the demand for white
l abo r (Dwt} As a result, Es

+

Ew

=

E* and W* remains unaffected.

In Figure 2 the workers arc high-skilled and the overall supply of labor (SL) is perfectly
inelastic. In t he absence of discrimination total employment will be E* and the wage rate will be
W*, as determined by the intersection of SL an d Dt..
white and black employment

at

Ass ume once again an equal amount or

E*. If this industry is non-competitive, firms earn

e xc es s

profits,

and employers act on a preference for discrimination, the result will be a decline in black \�'ages
relative to white wages. A ra c ia l wage gap equal to (\Vw- WB) will be created by Lhe bifurcation

of labor demand into the demand for black labor (DBL) and the demand for white labor
But Employment Discrimination will not be present.
Figure I

Ee Ew.u

E•

Ew

Figure 2
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Employment

(OwL).

w

Dwt.

E'

Employment

Single-industry and multi-indu s try tests of the Skill Based Hypothesis (Heywood &
Peo ples , 1994; /\g esa & M o naco , 2004) confi rm the predicted Employment Discrimination
effects: the employment of black low-skill w orkers is indeed negatively correlated with a lack of

competition in product markets, whereas the employment of black high-skill workers appears to
be umelated to the e x tent of product market concentration. A rec ent multi-industry study of t he

Earnings Discrimination implications of the Skill Based Hypo th esis, however, finds that both
unionization and black labo r -supply constraints at higher skill levels influence the actual
relation s hip between job-skill level and the racial wage gap in c oncent rated industries (Age sa &

Monaco, 2006).
3. Single-Industry

of Employment Discrimination:

S tudies

Lessons from Airlines and Trucking

Studies of Deregulati on 's effect

on Employment Discrimination in the for-hire segment

of the t rucking industry incl ude Heywood & Peoples (1994) and Agesa (1998). The major case
study of Der egulation and E mp loyment Discrimination in the airline ind ust ry is Agcsa (2001). In
thi s section I review Agesa {2001) in some detail. By comparing and contrast ing her results with
those obtained in the tr ucking studies, I highlight two key factor s that infl uenc e Deregulation's
effect on racial em ploy ment patte rn s .
Deregulation began in the airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
In J 981 , entry restrictions were removed.

which suspended minimum pricing policies.

Agesa

(2001) studies these reforms' ef fects on racial employment patterns in five airline o ccupations:
managers, pilots, mechanics, ticket agents, a nd flight attendants. A l l data on these occupations,
covering the period J 973 - 1996, were obtained from Current Population Sur vey documents .

Agesa tests a specific form ulation of the Basic Becker Hypoth esis: Deregulat io n will
reduce the industry's abi lity to exercise a given preference for racial discrimination in hi ring, and

min ority

(non-white)

period of Regulation

The argument proceeds as follows.

employm ent will rise.

( from

restrictions were in place, along with fare controls.
activit-y within

The government also controlled merger

This r egulat ory r egi me, presumably, reduced the level of

the in dustry.

competition among carriers.

During the

the 1930's up to th e Airli ne Deregulation Act) entry and exit

This lack of comp etiti on , i n tu rn, may have resulted in excess

profits�which would have giv en empl oyers the ability to exercise a p re ference for r a cia l
discrimination in emp l o yment.

Deregulating the indust ry, and hence promoting increased

competition among (existing and nevv) carriers, shoul d lead to

a

decli ne in the le vel
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Employment Discrimination.
To test this argument, Agesa asks three specific questions.

First: How did airline

deregulation influence racial employment in each of the five airline occupations, relative

to

racial

employment in an economy-wide comparison group containing all non-agricultural/non-airline
\vorkers in similar occupations?

To ans\ver this question Agesa uses dummy variables in her

regressions to identify, for both the Pre-deregulation period (1973-78) and the Post-deregulation
period (1979-96), the racial employment gap Cor each airline occupation: the difference between
the racial employment pattern in that occupation and the racial employment pattern in thar
occupation's nation-wide comparison group.

Agesa then includes a term capturing the

interaction beLw·een racial employment in the airline industry and Deregulation.

This variable

reveals the difference betv�'ccn the racial employment gap in each occupation during 1973-78 arnd
the racial employment gap in each occupation during 1979-96. If the Basic Becker Hypothesis is
true, the coefficient on this interaction term-for each airline occupation-should be significant.
Specifically, the racial employment gaps should decrease as a result of Deregulation.
The second question Agesa focuses on is: Were the changes in racial employment in each
of thc five airline occupations, over tbe entire period 1973-1996, the result ofDeregulation, or of
nation-\vide trends in racial employment? Finally, Agesa asks: What was the size of the ''racial
employment gap" between each airline occupation and its national comparison group over the
entire sample period, at each two-to-three year interval? Answering these questions required 1\vo
additional regression specifications.
Agesa's findings, on the surface, do not support the Basic Becker Hypothesis.

The

coefficient on the key interaction term in her first regression specification was small and
insignificant for all five occupations, indicating that Deregulation had little or no influence on
any of the racial employment gaps.

With respect to the second question, in four of the five

airline occupations (all except flight attendants) the changes that occurred in racial employment
over the entire sample period can be attributed to the changes in racial employment that occurred
in similar occupations nation-wide. FinaUy, Agesa's third specification yields no strong evidence
of Employment Discrimination in the airline industry, either before or after Deregulation.

In

sum, it appears as if the Basic Becker Hypothesis, in this particular context, should be rejected.
The studies of Deregulation's effect on racial employment in trucking generated a very
different set of results.

Trucking, like the airline industry, began to be deregulated in 1978.

In

1980 the Motor Carrier Act completed the process. In the aftermath of these reforms the industry
experienced a huge increase in the number of caniers.

Total employment exploded, and the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters lost quite a bit of control over the industr�y labor supp1y
(Peoples, 1998).

Heywood & Peoples (1994) and Agesa (1998) found, moreover, that minority

employment increased significantly as a result ofDeregulation. In contrast to what happened in
the airline industry, Deregulation in trucking led directly to a redut.:tion in the level of
EmploymentDiscrimination.
Why were such different results obtained for trucking and airlines?
points out, two key insights enable

LIS

As Agcsa (200 1)

to understand, and reconcile, the observed correlation

between Deregulation and racial employment patterns in each industry.

First, the Basic Becker

Hypothesis predicts that the level of racial discrimination in an industry is not ini1uenced by
Deregulation in and of itself, but rather by the change in product market structure that results
from Deregulation.

Trucking is a naturally competitive industry Yvith low barriers Lo enlry

(Hirsch & Macpherson, 1998; Peoples, 1998). Deregulating trucking, therefore, transformed the
69

structure of this industry. Prior to Deregulation trucking was a sheltered, protecled, non
competiti v e industry. In th e wake of the 1978 and 1980 regulato ry reforms, life as a provider of
trucking services changed entirely: competition for business became, and has remained, fierce.
Deregulating the airline industry, however, did not change the c o mpetitive nature of the
business. A lthough carriers did not engage in price co mpetition under Regulation, they did
compete with each other along n on-pr i c e service-oriented dimensions (Peoples, 1998). Ai rlines
fought for busi ne ss by adjusting their flight schedules, Hying different types of aircraft, offering
varied seating arrangements and options, and p roviding other passenger amenities. Dere gula tion
merely shifted the focus of competition to pricing Carriers, in sum, competed with each other
fiercely (albeit in different ways) both before and after Deregulation. E mplo yers in the airline
industry had little if any ability-throughout the sample p eri od 197 3 -1 996-to indulge a costly
preference for racial discrimination in hiring.
Second, as Agesa (200 1) poin ts out, there is a si gni ficant difference bet\veen trucking and
airlines in terms of the general skill level of employees. In trucking, low-skill \Vorkers
predominate. During the early to mid-1970's 51% of e mplo yees in trucking v..ue in low-skill
occupationa l categories such as "operators" and "laborers," whereas only 17% of employees were
in high-skill occupational categories (Agcsa, 2001). The supply of labor to the trucking industry
can thus be considered as relatively elastic: most workers are easily replaced, and the needed
skills can be quickly acquired on the job or with a little bit of training. Airline employment, in
contrast, is concentrated in high-ski11 occupational categories. According to Agesa (2001),
during the 1973-78 Pre-deregulation period the majority of airline employees were in high-skill
occupn tion s, with only 8% of e mploye es classified as low-skill "operators" or "laborers."
Jn light of these two features of the trucking and airlines industries, the Basic Becker
Hypothesis predicts that Deregulation should result in (1) no change in the level of racial
discrimination in the airline industry, and {2) a drop in the level of racial discrimination in
trucking. More specifically, the Skill Based Hypothesis laid out in Section 2 predicts that
Deregulation should result in (1) little or no change in racial employment patterns in the airline
industry, and (2) a decline in the amount of E mplo yment Discrimination in trucking.
The results obtained by Agesa (2001) for airlines, and by Heywood & Peoples (1994) and
Agesa (1998) for trucking, match these predictions. These single industry case studies of the
relationship between Der egu lation and Employme nt Discrimination thus pr o vide support for the
Basic Becker Hypothesis and its skill-based extension-Dnce the pr o duct market consequences of
Deregulati on, and the occupational structure of each industry, are taken into account and
inco rp orated into the analysis.
4. Multi-Industry Studies of Earnings Discrimination:
Key Contributions and Results
Three important multi-in dustr y studies of the relationship between product market
concentration and the racial \Vage gap are Heywood (1987}, Peoples (1994), and Agcsa &
Monaco (2006). ln this section I highlight the contributions these articles make to the literature,
and summarize what they uncover about the forces driving Earnings Discrimination in the
workplace.
Heywood (1987) tests the relationship between Earnings Discrimination and
concentration in U.S. manufacturing, using data t1·om the 1981 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
His study improves upon the earlier work of Johnson (1978) and Fujii & Trapani (1978) in two
important respects. first, Heywood is the beneficia ry of a significant i mprovement in data
.

-
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collection.

Prior to 1 980, industries vve re di s ag gregated i n the needed data sets (e.g., the P anel

Study of Income Dynamic s ) to only the t\.vo-digit S I C (S tandard Industrial Classification) level.
This level of aggregation prevented Johnson and Fuj i i & Trapani fro m i d e nti i)'i n g the true pattern
of product market concentration in manufacturing, and from matching up wo rkers accurntely
\vith concentrated and unconcentrated indmtries.

Starting in 1 980 narrower three-di git SIC

industrial definitions were inco rpo rated into the Panel Study of Income Dynami c s and oth er
needed data sets. This gave Heywood the op p o rtun ity to capture, much more ful!y, the real i ty o f
product market concentration i n U . S . manufacturing.

H e was also able, as a result, to map

workers into co n centrate d and unconcentrated industries more accurat ely than J o hn so n and Fl�j i i
& Trapani \Vere able t o d o .
Second, Heywood addressed several key sources of specifi cation error present i n Johnson
and Fuj i i & T rapan i , by i ncl u d i ng several new independent variables in his wage equati on

.

For

example, Heyw·ood inc l ud ed the four-firm Concentration Ratio itself as an i n d epe nde nt variable,
arg ui n g that the failure of the earlier studies to do this could well have obscured or d istorted the

true effect of conc entration , by itself� on t he racial wage gap . Heywoo d also i ncluded
variable for union status.

,

dummy

Unions influence wages, and the Basic Becker Hypothesis slates that

conc ent ratio n affe ct s min o rity wages.
Union status, there fore

::1

But un io nizat i o n and concentration arc h i ghl y correlated.

must be controlled for in the wage equation.

Most imponantly,

H e ywood includes a dummy variable for black \Vorkcrs and a term capturing the interaction
between black worker status and pr od u ct market concentration.

If th e Basic Becker Hypothesis

is true then the coefficient on this interaction term is n egati ve : concentration, by itself, d epre s se s
black vvagcs relative to white wages, resulting in a bigger racial wage gap in concen tra t e d
industries than i n unconcentrated i nd us tr ie s

.

Heywood found that the coefficient on the race-concentration interaction term-under a
v ari et y of spe ci fi c ations was indeed negative and s ignificant.
-

Hcyvvood' s results thus reveal

strong support for the Basic B eck e r Hyp ot hes i s : Lhe black/white wage gap in U . S . manufacturing
does appear to be positively correlated with pro d uct market concentration.
Peoples ( 1 994) extends Heywood's w·ork by studying the extent to which unionization
affects the rel ati o n sh ip between pro d uct market concentration and the racial \:vage gap.

Since

unions are motivated to s tand ardize wages (Fre e m an , 1 9 80), Peoples argttes that the effect of
concentration on the racial wage gap may \Yell be smaller i n unionized i n dus trie s than i n non
unionized industries.

How d i d Peoples test this hypothesis?

By estimating separate wage

equations for union and non-union workers. Heywood, as noted earlier, d i d i n corpo rate a un i o n
status control i n h i s wage equation.

But such a variable, by itself, i s not enough to i solate and

h igh l i gh t the d i 1Terential impact o f union status on the rac i al wage gap
represents the first ful l ac cou nt i n g

,

.

Peop l es work, therefore,
'

in the literature on Earnings Discrimination and market

structure, o f the eftects of u nio n i zati on on the racial wage gap.
Peoples' results support h i s argument.

I n the non-union sector, the racial wage gap i s

indeed a positive function of pro duct market concentration.

B u t i n the u n i o n sector the racial

wage gap is una ffec ted by the extent o f product market concentration.

result as follows: The "union wage-standardization effec t

"

Peoples interprets this

prevents employers in unionized

industries from acti n g more ful l y on their preference for racial discrimination as product market
concentrmion increases. Unions, in other words, appear to protect black workers from managers
in concentrated industries who otherwise would have more of an ab i l i ty to i ndul ge a tas te for
Earnings Discrimination than their counterparts in unconcentrated i n d ustri e s
71

.

Peoples ( 1 994) shows, in sum, that the support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis found by
Heywood ( 1 987) is limited to the non-union sector.

Future work on the relationship between
product market structure and Earnings Discrimination, therefore, must account fully for the
impact of unionization.
Agcsa & Monaco (2006) extend the work of Peoples ( 1 994) and I-Ieyvmod ( 1 987) b: y
testing the Earnings Discrimination implications of the Skill Based Hypothesis.

Recall that this
extension of the B asic Becker Hypothesis predicts that the racial wage gap in concentrated
industries will increase along with the job-skill level: blacks in high-skilled occupations \Vill face
more Earnings Discrimination than blacks in lower-skilled occupations.
Age sa & Monaco test this prediction using data from the 1 99 1 - 1 996 issues of the CuJTent
Population Survey and the 1 992 Census of Manufacturers.

Following Heywood ( 1 987), they

match up vmrkers with concentrated and unconcentrated industries using three-digit SIC
industrial definitions.

'fhey also include as independent variables the four-firm Concentration

Ratio, a dummy variable for black workers, and a race-concentration interaction term that reveals
the extent to \Vhich product market concentration depresses black wages relative to white wages.
Following Peoples ( 1 994), Agesa & Monaco estimate separate wage equations for union and
non-union workers, to capture and highlight the unique impact of unionization on the racial wage
gap. Where Age sa & Monaco go beyond both Heywood ( 1 987) and Peoples ( 1 994) is in the use
of Quantile Regression.

This technique allows them to estimate racial wage gaps across the

spectrum of j ob-skill levels, rather than simply the average wage gap faced by all black workers
in concentrated industries and the average wage gap faced by all black workers in unconcentrated
industries.
Agesa & Monaco report three important results.

First, they find no correlation between

the racial wage gap and product market concentration-at any skill level-in unionized industries.
This confirms the work of Peoples ( 1 994): the "union wage-standardization effect" does indeed
protect black workers in unionized industries. Second, Agesa & Monaco find no evidence that
concentration increases the racial wage gap for high-skill blacks, regardless of their union status.
In fact, across all concentrated industries the racial wage gap shrinks dramatically as the j ob-skill
level rises.

Agesa & Monaco offer the following interpretation.

In the C P S data there is a

negative correlation between the prevalence of black employment and j ob-skill level: black
employment is relatively high in low-skill occupations, and falls off sharply as the job-skill level
increases. If this correlation is a labor-supply phenomenon, then the limited supply of high-skill
black workers, union and non-union alike, is protecting these \Vorkers from increased Earnings
Discrimination in concentrated industries.

Black labor-supply constraints at higher skill level'),

in other \Vords, may be driving the observed pattern of racial wage gaps in concentrated
industries.
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Finally, Agesa & Monaco discover that in the non-union sector the racial \:vagc gap is
positively correlated with product market concentration-for low-skilled and medium-skil led
occupations only. This indicates that the support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis found by
Peoples ( 1 9 94) in the non-union sector is driven by the increased Earnings Discrimination faced
by low- and medium-skill black workers.
Taken together, the results obtained by Heywood (! 987), Peoples ( J 994 ), and Agesa &
Monaco (2006) do not i nd icate that the Basic Becker Hypothesis should be rejected. Rather, they
point to three key features of the labor-market context that in11uence the underlying relationship
bctvl'·cen product market concentration and Earnings D iscrimination: Unionization, job-skill
level, and a limited supply of high-sk i l l blacks. In cases where black workers arc not protected
by union membership or by advanced education and training, they appear to be at the mercy of
employers in concentrated industries who seek to exercise a preference for racial discrimination
in the setting of wage rates.
5. Conclusion
More than 30 years after the publication of TheEconomicsofDiscriminatino in 1 97 L ,
Becker's theory o f discrimination continues to define the empirical research eff()rl. The results
of this eiTort to date show, moreover, that the Basic Becker Hypothesis is still the place \vbere
researchers must start when attempting to explain patterns of racial discrimination in the
workplace. Analysts \Vho have conducted single-industt)' case studies have found, in general,
strong support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis. When the level of competition increases in an
industry (e.g., i n the aftermath of Deregulation), then employment opportunities for minorities
expand and racial \Vagc gaps s!u·ink.
Multi-industry studies have led researchers to develop a more nuanced, context-specific
vicv"' of the Basic Becker Hypothesis: the actual relationshi p between product market structure
and racial discrimination i n the workplace is more complex and multi-Caceted than Becker's
theory suggests. Product market concentration does appear to i nfluence both racial employment
patterns and racial wage gaps across U . S . industry. But other features of the labor-market
context also matter, such as unionization, job-skill level, and black labor-supp�y constraints at
higher skill levels.
These results lead d i rectly to two points of concern for the future. first, the decline of
unionization in the U.S. is hurting black workers, especially those in low-ski 11 and medium-skill
occupations. As union membership continues to decline, more and more low- and medium-skill
black \Vorkers will likely become victims of employers i n concentrated industries who seck to
exercise a preference for racial discrim ination. Second, if it is the case that high-skill black
workers are being protected from d iscrimination by their limited availability, then increased
access to advanced education and training may, paradoxically, expose these workers to more
discrimination in the workplace. This may require more, not less, vigilance with respect to
Affirmative Action issues in the future.
FinaHy, where should the research eff01t go from here? I offer two suggestions. First, it
is time (if possible) to take this effort into the services sector. ·rhe mnjor studies done to date
have focused on U.S. manufacturinQ, or on the industrial sector as a whole. But the vast bulk or
employment in the economy is now, of course, in services. It will be interesting to uncover the
extent to which Employment Discrimination and Earnings Discrimination exist i n this sector.
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W i l l the Basic Becker Hypothesis and its ski l l -based extension explain the racial employment
patterns and racial wage gaps that do exist in services? What other features of the services-sector
labor market influence the relationship between product market structure and racial
discrimination?
Second, future research could attempt to focus on the principal-agent nature of Becker' s
.

,

'
'

original form ulation. What i s the connection between the racial composition of firm ownership
and racial d iscrimination i n the workplace? Are racial wage gaps and racial employment patterns
d i fferent (as most would suspect) in black-owned firms than in white-owned firms? Is there a
separate, unique effect of white ownership on the relationship between product market
concentration and racial discrimination in the workplace? Tackling these questions across the
entire economy, of course, may not be possible. But there just might be enough i n formation
available on the small-business sector and/or the self-employment component of our economy to

get started. Maybe now i s a good time to find out.

74

References
Agesa, J. ( 1 998). The i mpact of deregulation on employment discrimination in the
trucking i n dustry. Atlantic Economic Iomnal. 26_ 288-303.
Agcsa, J. (2001 ). Deregulation and the racial composition of airlines. Tomnal ofPolicy

AnalysisandManagement,20, 223-37.
Agesa, J . , & Agesa, R. (in press). Market structure-driven d i scrimination and the
earnings of subordinate managers: An analysis by union density. lo.u.mal ofPost-Keynesian

Economics .
Agesa, J . , & Monaco, K . (2004). Industry racial employment by skill level: The effects of
market structure and racial vvage gaps. IournalorI.CJhor Research, ?5.., 3 1 5 - 2 8 .
Agesa, J . , & Monaco, K . (2006). Market power and racial earnings: A quantile regression
approach. In J.

S.

Heywood & J. H . Peoples (Eds.), ProdJJct market stwctnrca11dlabormarket

discrimination (pp.
Becker, G.
Press .

1 5-37). Albany:

S.

SUNY

Press.

( 1 957). ·rbeeconomics ofdisoimination . Chicago: University o f C h icugo

.
(?nd
B eck er, G . S . ( 1 97 1 ) . II1eeconom1csot'd'
Jscnmmatwn
.

.

.

_

ecI .

).

.
ct ·
U .
ucago: mvers1ty of

Chicago Press.
Comanor, V·-/.

S.

( 1 973). Racial discrimination in american industry.

B:on.o.m..i.ca..A.O..

3 6 3 -7 8 .
Freeman, R . ( 1 980). Unionism and the dispersion o f wages. ln.d.u.s.trialand I,ahor

Relalions Review, l4,

3-23.

Fuj ii, E. T., & Trapani, J . M . ( 1 978). On estimating the relationship between
d i scrimination and market structure. Southern Economic IoJJrnal, 44, 556-67.
Haessel, V./. P., & Palmer, J . \V. ( 1 978). Market pow·er and empl oyment discrimination.
Iomnal ofHnman Hcsomces_ 11_ 545-60.
Heywood, J.

S. ( 1 987). Wage discrimination and market
Keynesian Economics, 9, 6 1 7-628.

structure.

lomnalnf'Post

Heywood, l S . ( 1 998). Regulated i ndus t ri es and measures of earnings discrimin1:1tion. In
J H . Peoples (Ed.),

Reg11laloryreform andlabormarkers. Norwell, M A : Kl uwer.
Heywood, J. S., & Peoples, J. H . ( 1 9 94). Deregulation and the preval ence of black truck
drivers. Io11rnal ofI.awandF.conomics, 17_ 1 33 -55.
H irsch, B . T., & Iv1acpherson, D . ( 1 998). Earnings and employment in trucking:
Deregulating a naturally competitive industry. In J. 1-L Peoples (Ed.), Regnlaloryref�mnand
labormarkets. Norwell, MA: Kluwer.
Johnson, W. R. ( 1 978). Racial wage discrimination and industrial structure. Hell ]o11rnal
ofEconnmics, 9, 70-8 1 .
Peoples, J H . ( 1 994). Monopolistic market stru<..:tu re, unionization, and racial wage
differentials.

ReviewofEconomicsnnd Statistics,76, 207- 1 1 .

Peoples, J. 1-l. ( 1 998). Deregulation and the labor market.

Perspectives, 12,

Jonrna] ofFconomit:

1 1 1 -3 0 .

Peoples, .J. H., & Robinson, R. ( 1 996). Market structure and racial and gender

discriminiation: Evidence fi-om the telecommunications industry.
75

American Journal of

EconomicsandSociology:,_'\.5., 309-26.
Peoples, J. H . , & Saunders, L. ( I 993). Trucking deregulation and the black/white wage
gap. Indnstrial and LaborRelationsReview,47. 23-35.
Rose, N. L. ( l 9S7). Labor rent sharing and regulation: Evidence from the trucking
industry. luurnal ofPoliticaLEconomy.� 1 1 46-78.
Shepherd, W. G., & Levin, S. G. ( 1 973). Managerial discrimination in large firms.
Beview ofEconomicsand Statistics. '15, 4 1 2-22.

76

